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In recent times fiscal policy has contributed to creating bottlenecks in the 
economy by crowding out resource flows to the most productive sectors of the 
economy.  Irresponsible budget policy and public administration has contributed 
to higher prices and higher interest rates.  A discretionary tightening is now long 
overdue to assist in dampening cost pressures along with a pursuit of 
fundamental microeconomic reforms in the protected sectors of the economy.  
The fiscal tightening should be of the order of 2 per cent of GDP in 2008-09.  
This task requires immediate, decisive action on the part of government and 
the full support of the bureaucracy.  Any delay will be measured in terms of 
higher prices and interest rates and lower growth over the next three years. 
Introduction
This briefing suggests a framework to assist the new Government’s deliberations on the 
most appropriate settings for budget policy, given the current precarious stance of
macroeconomic policy in Australia. For the first time in a decade fiscal policy settings
underpinning the 2008-09 Budget could take the lead in of macroeconomic stabilisation, 
helping to restore strong and steady growth and price stability, whilst supporting national 
savings and the credibility and sustainability of budget settings.
Fiscal policy has multiple objectives. 
 It should assist to stabilise the business cycle through counter cyclical tax and 
spending policies centred on the automatic stabilisers of the budget. 
 It should contribute to national savings over time and prevent a widening of the 
current account deficit, and facilitate the elimination of imbalances in the domestic 
economy, including those created via distorted patterns of saving and investment 
(Corden 1991).  
 It should contribute to productivity and long run growth through targeted spending 
programs which account for the opportunity cost of resources, encourage wealth 
creation and discourage rent seekers.  It should make transparent the cost of all 
government actitivities including implicit subsidies and regulation (Starrett 1983).
 It should encourage the distribution of adequate means to those most 
disadvantaged individuals in society over time.
 It should promote sustainability of policy by acknowledging all the costs faced by 
governments and the opportunities afforded us to meet them.
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1 Recent History of Fiscal Strategy
Running consistent budget surpluses from the mid to late 1990s helped to restore the 
Commonwealth’s balance sheet which had been jeopardised by stubborn and persistent 
budget deficits even during the recovery of the economy in the mid 1990s.  This helped to 
reduce price expectations, along with the Reserve Bank’s inflation targeting mandate. This 
ushered in an era of low interest rates in Australia which encouraged private sector 
investment and job creation.  But it also had some unfortunate unintended consequences.
By the early to middle 2000s, low interest rates and short sighted budgetary policies had 
encouraged a debt financed housing boom which is still unwinding today.  One Treasury 
official put it very succinctly:
“Over the last decade, Australia has experienced a housing boom of 
unprecedented proportions. Both construction activity and house prices have 
increased dramatically, driven by low interest rates, greater consumer access to 
housing finance, an increase in net immigration, and continued increases in 
household income. House prices have also been affected by supply side 
constraints, particularly on land release (Parkinson 2004)”.
By the middle of the decade the housing boom had absorbed more than half of all new 
investment in Australia in the first half of the 2000s and added substantially to the CAD and 
national debt. It was not a clear win for policy as the Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank 
remarked at the time: 
“This was not obviously related to population growth, which was not unusually 
high in the recent period. The number of new dwellings constructed was not 
unusual compared with previous booms. What is new is that the quality and size 
of dwellings, both new dwellings and those being renovated, are higher than in 
the past. That is to say, the community has much higher standards for 
accommodation than was formerly the case, and is investing additional 
resources accordingly.  Was this a good investment? For that part of the 
investment undertaken in expectation of commercial returns, some reservations 
must be recorded (Stevens 2004)”. 
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1.1 The Housing boom and inadequate public infrastructure 
Much of the investment in housing was debt financed chasing speculative profits rather 
than patient returns. So the quality of capital expenditure was often poor, encouraged in 
part by short sighted Commonwealth tax and spending programs which crowded out 
investment in more conservative, lower yielding, options such as public infrastructure 
assets or rental accommodation construction in favour of short term capital gains and 
negative gearing on existing residential properties. This was becoming increasingly obvious 
by mid to late 2004 when both commentators and the Reserve Bank were noting the 
inadequacy of public infrastructure in Australia.  A case in point was the Dalrymple Bay 
Coal Terminal which was the most transparent example of an infrastructure bottleneck
inhibiting the growth of Australian exports.1  While much of the commentary on public 
infrastructure issues focused on the need for new public spending to eliminate perceived 
‘inadequacy’ of the existing capital stock, part of the explanation why spending had not yet 
occurred was due to regulatory and competition issues.2  A significant impediment to the 
further development of critical infrastructure in Australia appears to have been the way the 
current economic regulatory framework is structured and administered, in addition to the 
fiscal policies of Commonwealth and State governments. 
The first evidence of supply side bottlenecks in the Australian economy generated by the 
China boom also coincided with a rapid upswing in the growth of commodities prices from 
March 2004.  This upswing would continue for consecutive quarters until June 2007, when 
prices reached a 50 year peak, signalling a significant risk for policy management based on 
the previous experience post WW2.
                                                  
1
Coal producers still face a congested coal supply chain and ship loading facilities after four years.  However, at 
its peak the queue was 50 ships waiting to be loaded at the Terminal on 30 March 2005.
2
The States own, operate and oversight (regulate) most of major service delivery infrastructure in Australia like 
ports, railways, major roads, hospitals, and schools. Along with the Commonwealth they were unable to overcome 
regulatory barriers to new investment and encourage greater private sector participation.
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1.2 The Commodity boom and inadequate public saving
The first commentator to see the implications and risks for fiscal policy was Professor Ross 
Garnaut of the Australian National University who sent a very clear signal to policy makers 
in December 2004:
“It would help if fiscal policy were now tightened considerably. It would have 
been better done much earlier, but now is better than later. This would take 
pressure from domestic demand without raising the exchange rate - as 
tightening monetary policy would do. But if fiscal adjustment were small or long 
delayed, and domestic demand growth and non-tradeables inflation continued 
near recent levels, for all its risks to a debt-ridden household economy, 
monetary tightening would still be necessary to contain vulnerability to extreme 
international market responses. 
It would have helped if the price index that is the object of the inflation targets 
had been an index of non-tradeables prices, excluding the deflationary effects of 
exchange rate appreciation in recent years, and the inflationary effects of any 
large depreciation in the period ahead  (Garnaut 2004).” 3
Unfortunately, the three Commonwealth budgets from 2004-05 did exactly the opposite to 
what was required of responsible fiscal management.  Table 1 shows the impact of 
parameter and policy variations on the budget bottom-line for each budget since 1996-97.  
It reveals the extent of the poor spending discipline that will be a legacy of the previous 
Government as well as the extent to which the budget bottom-line was assisted by 
favourable policy and other variations that were neither ‘banked’ by government, nor 
handed back to taxpayers.
While the previous Government made modest spending cuts over its first two budgets this 
situation had reversed itself in cumulative terms by 2000-2001 and was  exacerbated soon 
after by the slowdown in activity associated with the introduction of the GST.  While some 
discretionary easing was justified in that year, this was clearly not the case in the budgets 
that followed. Since the 2001-2002 Budget there has been a discretionary 
                                                  
3
 I also acknowledge Chris Richardson of Access Economics who has been one of strongest and most articulate 
advocates for national savings over the past four years.
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Table 1 Impact of Budget Policy Spending From 1996-97
1996-97*
$b
1997-98*
$b
1998-99*
$b
1999-00
$b
2000-01
$b
2001-02
$b
Budget Balance -4.2 -2.0 3.8 11.9 5.6 -3.4
Impact of revenue 
policy decisions 
1.0 1.9 1.7 1.1 1.8 -1.2
Impact of spending 
policy decisions 
2.0 5.0 2.9 -5.1 -10.6 -10.6
Effect of 
Parameter 
Variations
-2.0 -0.8 -1.7 9.1 5.8 -0.5
Budget Balance 
with ‘no change’ 
to discretionary 
spending
-6.2 -7.0 0.9 17.0 16.2 7.2
Total cumulative 
impact of spending 
policy decisions since 
the 1996 Election
2.0 7.0 9.9 4.8 -5.8 -16.4
2002-03
$b
2003-04
$b
2004-05
$b
2005-06
$b
2006-07
$b
2007-08
$b
Budget Balance 4.7 4.8 10.8 14.8 15.4 14.8(e)
Impact of revenue 
policy decisions 
0.5 -4.2 -3.9 -13.8 -19.4 -26.1
Impact of spending 
policy decisions 
-10.4 -15.6 -13.4 -17.6 -27.5 -26.3
Effect of 
parameter 
variations
-0.6 9.5 21.5 37.7 56.5 61.4
Budget Balance 
with ‘no change’ 
to discretionary 
spending
15.1 20.4 24.3 32.4 42.9 41.1
Total cumulative 
impact of spending 
decisions since the 
1996 Election
-26.8 -42.4 -55.8 -77.4 -104.9 -131.0
Source: ABS, Budget Papers & Macroeconomics.com.au estimates.
A positive number for revenue or expenses indicates an improvement in the budget balance.  The figures 
in the table are subject to rounding. *Prior to 1999-2000 figures are based on the underlying cash balance. 
There are some major comparability issues around the shift to accrual accounting.  For example, the 
above table does not include the recorded removal of revenues and expenses from the Commonwealth 
General Government in the 1999-2000 Budget for the 2000-01 and 2001-02 years.
Reconciliation between years to account for the cumulative impact of decisions and parameters is limited 
by detail provided in various budget papers so that a dollar for dollar reconciliation is not possible. For 
example, variations occurring in between the last Budget estimate and Final Budget Outcome have not 
been reported since 1996-97.
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loosening of spending currently worth around $26 billion annually. Indeed most of the 
damage has occurred from the 2004-05 Budget onwards, when it was clear to all and 
sundry that a terms of trade shock was underway.  From this Budget onwards government 
has spent an additional $86 billion over three years in new policy, including the current year 
(2007-08), but excluding the entire forward estimates period.4  I do not include contribution 
of these years to allow time for the new Government to correct the situation.  However, the 
calculation including the Budget and out years has been undertaken by Saul Eslake from 
the ANZ:
“Shortly before the 2007 election I estimated that, since the 2003-04 Budget, 
so-called ‘parameter variations’ had added some $457 billion to the resources 
available to the Government over the nine years to 2010-11; and that, of this 
amount, $435 billion had been or would be spent or given away in tax cuts, and 
only $22 billion ’saved’ in the form of Budget surpluses. And of this $435 billion, 
at least $270 billion had taken or would take the form of personal income tax 
cuts (including those the Labor Party has pledged) (Eslake 2008).”
The justification for all the new policy spending from 2004-05 is highly questionable (with 
the possible exception of much of the security related expenditures for deployments in Iraq 
and Afghanistan), based on the state of the  economic and trade cycle, given that the bulk 
of new spending has added momentum to an economy lacking idle capacity. The 
distribution and number of new budget measures by the Commonwealth government, along 
with some analysis of the growth of the Australian Public Service over the period, is 
outlined in more detail in a paper by Laurie & McDonald (2008).  
Blind Freddy could have told you by mid 2006 that INFLATION was the issue of the day but 
unfortunately the penny had not yet dropped.  One exception occurred on the Sunday 
program on 6 August 2006 when Opposition Leader Kim Beazley told Laurie Oakes that 
Australia needed a mini budget:
“I think the point about this is that what the Reserve Bank has identified as 
capacity constraints are creating the inflationary pressures. The poor 
performance of our infrastructure is creating inflationary pressures. The absence 
                                                  
4
This also ignores the impact of tax cuts and the growth in tax expenditures in those years which contributed 
about the same again to growth.
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of the required number of skilled tradesmen is creating inflationary pressures. 
The threat to our productivity that emerges from all this is creating inflationary 
pressures. We cannot afford to keep ignoring this, and fail to address it and that 
is the point of a mini budget. If you have a mini budget based on those 
considerations, then I think you will have the respect of the Reserve Bank and 
they will take that into account when they subsequently deliver — deliberate on 
further interest rate rises or not, as the case may be. The point is you cannot 
afford Howard's complacency. This is poor economic management as well as 
breach of trust.”
Table 2 Structural Budget Balance From 1996-97                                                                                                                                                          
1996-97
$b
1997-98
$b
1998-99
$b
1999-00
$b
2000-01
$b
2001-02
$b
Budget Balance -4.2 -2.0 3.8 11.9 5.6 -3.4
Impact of the Economic 
Cycle
1.7 2.3 -5.0 -10.5 -3.2 7.0
Impact of the Commodity 
Cycle
-0.4 -0.5 -0.0 -0.9 -1.1 -1.4
Structural Balance -5.6 -3.8 -1.7 0.5 1.3 2.2
(Per cent of GDP) -1.1 -0.7 -0.3 0.0 0.2 0.3
2002-03
$b
2003-04
$b
2004-05
$b
2005-06
$b
2006-07
$b
2007-08 
$b
Budget Balance 4.7 4.8 10.8 14.8 15.4 14.8(e)
Impact of the Economic 
Cycle
-1.2 -2.5 -4.0 -8.2 -12.6 -12.3
Impact of the Commodity 
Cycle
-1.5 -3.0 -8.7 -12.0 -17.0 -16.4
Structural Balance 2.0 -0.7 -2.7 -5.4 -14.2 -13.8
(Per cent of GDP) 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -1.4 -1.2
Source: ABS, Budget Papers & Macroeconomics.com.au estimates.  Subject to rounding.
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One of the most disappointing aspects of the spending outcomes since 1999-2000 
(especially over the last three Budget outcomes) has been that the frittering away of hard 
won gains from economic reforms and transitory gains from the commodity cycle.  Table 2 
outlines estimates of the structural balance in Australia over the period 1996-97 to the 
current year 2007-08 based on the Macroeconomics.com.au Structural Budget Model of
the Commonwealth Budget.  It estimates that without the assistance of the commodity 
cycle and strong economy the budget would now be around $14 billion dollars in deficit in 
2007-08, which in GDP terms is very similar to the size of the structural deficit that existed 
in 1996-97.
The analysis presented in Tables 1 & 2 implies that the immediate and appropriate target 
for fiscal strategy should be a discretionary tightening of around 2 per cent of GDP leaving 
a buffer of around $5 to $10 billion in store to safeguard against the need for a easing of 
discretionary policy if the economy slows.  In addition, this analysis does not account for 
the structural dis-saving of State governments that have failed to ‘bank’ their own stamp 
duty and land sales windfalls and have contributed to the growth in public spending. This 
would argue for a Commonwealth savings target closer to 3 per cent of GDP.  It is my 
belief that this savings target is larger than that currently under consideration by the new 
Government.
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2 Outcome of Fiscal Easing
My hypothesis is that profligate fiscal policy has lead to higher prices in an era of full 
employment which inevitably resulted in higher interest rates.  Before the Reserve Bank 
began the current tightening round, interest rates were at a 30 year low of 4.25 per cent in 
April 2002.  Since that point the structural budget position has deteriorated by around       
1½ per cent of GDP on the back of new policy decision worth around $26 billion each year. 
Over that period interest rates have risen 12 times by a total of 300 bps. Most of the 
tightening (200bps) has occurred after the 2004-05 Budget was brought down and I argue 
below that it is due in part to poor budget decision making and public administration by both 
Commonwealth and state governments awash with windfall receipts from the housing and 
commodity booms.
2.1 Fiscal policy & higher interest rates via bottlenecks in supply
Movements in short term interest rates are driven by monetary policy and the outlook for 
inflation which is driven by expectations.  The main link between inflationary pressures and 
fiscal policy is through the level of activity.  If policy settings introduce a significant stimulus 
at a time of full capacity then it is possible that fiscal policy can contribute to higher interest 
rates.5  By targeting low positive inflation, monetary policy is implicitly targeting the ‘output 
gap’ between potential and actual output. When that output gap is close to zero, any policy 
action which adds further momentum into demand feeds directly into higher prices.  
A rule of thumb for measuring the impact of this stimulus on prices for a fully employed 
economy is proportionality, i.e. any further structural deterioration in the budget leads to a 
matching percentage point change in consumer prices in the economy.  Therefore one way 
that governments can ease cost of living pressures on Australian families is identifying 
cuts where demand is contributing to existing bottlenecks in terms of shortages of 
skilled labour and infrastructure and by over time building the stock of human capital and 
public infrastructure.
                                                  
5 Rising interest rates have occurred in part as  a result of a malfunctioning public sector through its direct 
contribution to demand for goods and services produced by the nation as a whole and indirectly by starving the 
supply of skills and infrastructure in specific sectors through poor quality spending decisions.
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2.2 Fiscal policy & higher interest rates via risk premia  
Movements in long-term interest rates are driven by a combination of factors such as the 
condition of the public balance sheet public (as well as inflationary expectations). As the 
credibility of fiscal policy declines, investors may require a premium as compensation for 
holding government debt in their portfolios.   
Research previously undertaken by the author suggests that a discretionary easing of the 
structural budget balance is seen by financial markets as equivalent to a deterioration in the 
balance sheet of government,  using the stock of net debt as a proxy (Comley et al  2002).6  
This research suggests that the structural deterioration in the budget bottom-line of 
between 1½  to 2 per cent of GDP would add around 50-75 basis points to yields on 
long dated securities over the short term and around 50 basis points to yields after five 
quarters.  It is also suggests that these long term funding costs feed back into shorter term 
interest rates as inflation expectations build.  If this feedback mechanism is correct, it would 
imply that around one-quarter of the total increase in short-term official interest rates since 
the 2001-02 Budget has occurred through the indirect channel of risk premia related 
inflation expectations. This suggests that the most effective way for government to
relieve cost of living pressures on Australian families would be to reverse the
deterioration in the structural budget by finding savings of up to 2 per cent of GDP,
immediately.
                                                  
6
The reduction in risk premia is very much a judgment by the markets on the Government’s fiscal performance.
I argue that the market considers risk premia to be a function of the stock of Commonwealth net assets. However, 
risk premia may also stem from factors other than the markets perception of the Commonwealth’s financial 
strength. Alternatively some would argue that imperfect markets may view risk premia only as a function of 
Commonwealth general government net debt. In this case, further risk premia gains will likely be very small due to 
Australia’s low levels of net debt. Furthermore, the relationship between risk premia and net debt may not be one 
for one.  For instance, risk premia may be very small for ‘prudent’ levels of debt but grow at an accelerating rate 
when debt gets above some arbitrary level like the OECD average.  Either way, any further elimination of net debt 
may have a minuscule affect on the size of the risk premia.  
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2.3 Fiscal policy & higher interest rates via administered prices
Poor public administration has also contributed much to cost pressures in recent years 
leading to higher interest rates. Low quality spending choices, coupled with ineffective 
processes to review the spending base, have inhibited performance management and 
supported waste and anti-competitive management and labour practices.   
Evidence for this argument can be seen in the growth in administered prices, namely 
price changes in consumables determined in large part by government. A number of items 
including alcohol & tobacco, utilities, property rates & charges, hospital & medical services, 
pharmaceuticals, urban transport fares, motoring charges, post, education and child care 
have so-called administered prices which are set by government, rather than market forces.
Administered items represent close to one quarter of the total Consumer Price Index by 
value. The annual rate of increase in administered prices has been around 4 ¾ per cent 
since 2001-02 and has consistently outpaced the growth of those consumer prices 
determined by market forces at 1¾ per cent, per annum, excluding volatile items, over the 
same period.
The growth in administered prices provides a frequent indicator of the success or failure of 
competition policy in various protected sectors of the Australian economy because it should 
not be possible for prices to grow in advance of CPI over the longer term.  Therefore 
another way that government can ease cost of living pressures on Australian families over 
the medium term is to undertake microeconomic reforms focusing on raising competition
throughout the protected sectors of the Australian economy.
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3 Assessment of Fiscal Strategy
When measured against the five criteria identified earlier to assess fiscal policy, the recent 
track record of fiscal strategy has been a failure.
3.1 Criteria for assessing fiscal strategy
The stabilisation role for fiscal policy has failed since the modest slowdown in 2000-2001. 
Theory and evidence suggests that profligate pro-cyclical fiscal policy has contributed to 
tighter monetary policy than would have otherwise been necessary.  There is also a risk 
that the future tightening of policy will contribute to an economic slowdown some time in 
late 2009 or 2010 due to the policy tightening occurring too late in the business cycle.
The precautionary saving role for fiscal policy has failed in part as seen by the widening of 
the structural current account deficit which has reached around 7 per cent of GDP in the 
December Quarter of 2007 fuelled by dis-saving reflected in buoyant consumption 
expenditure on the part of both the private and public sector. While this is true, it must be 
acknowledged that over $80 billion dollars in surpluses were banked by the previous 
Government which has helped to offset dis-saving in the rest of the Australian economy 
over much of the past decade and narrow the current account deficit. In addition, the 
previous Government established savings vehicles such as the Future Fund, a valuable 
institutional development which can be built upon later.  
Unfortunately, the previous Government spent more on new policy measure than it banked 
in surpluses. While it is it is naïve to expect any government to save all of its windfall gains, 
surely more should have been squirreled away.  It was also necessary to provide an 
example for State governments that collectively have an even poorer record on national 
saving.  So the pool of national savings is now smaller than it should have been. In 
addition, very little was done to address the inherent bias against productive investment
over the period, but much was done exacerbate the problem. 
The enhancing productivity role of government spending has also failed inadequate 
performance of expenditure review processes, including program reviews, and due to
flagrant violations of standing budget rules by senior ministers of the previous Government 
who regularly failed to consult their departments before making decisions.  It has always 
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been true that spending decisions were driven in part by political considerations. But in 
recent years government perfected the art of targeting record spending announcements to 
Table 3 Real Spending Growth By Function From 1996-97
1996-97*
$b
1998-99
$b
Growth
%
1999-00
$b
2006-07
$b
Growth
%
Decade 
Growth
%
Function
General Public 
Services
8758.8 8269.2 -2.8 11676.1 14615 3.6 6.1
Defence 12689.3 13257.2 2.2 12949.3 16854 4.3 3.0
Public Order & 
Safety
1555.7 1264.8 -9.3 1399.3 3318 19.6 10.3
Education 13749.2 13615.7 -0.5 12729.3 16898 4.7 2.1
Health 24358.1 26149.7 3.7 29034.6 39948 5.4 5.8
Social security & 
welfare
62950.3 63527.8 0.5 70560.0 92075 4.4 4.2
Housing & 
Community 
Services
1224.9 1302.4 3.2 2279.4 2909 3.9 12.5
Recreation & 
culture
1744.8 1629.6 -3.3 1823.2 2561 5.8 4.3
Fuel & energy 16.8 71.0 N/A 39.6 4635 N/A N/A
Agriculture 
Forestry & Fishing
2358.6 2519.9 3.4 2206.4 2831 4.0 1.8
Mining, minerals 
& manufacturing
2129.4 2087.3 -1.0 1107.5 1920 10.5 -0.9
Transport and 
communications
1420.8 1354.4 -2.3 2471.0 3296 4.8 N/A
Other economic 
affairs
4243.9 3740.0 -5.9 3920.9 5165 4.5 2.0
Other purposes 29199.0 33088.5 6.7 31954.3 12339 -8.8 -5.2
Total GFS 166399.6 171877.7 1.6 184150.8 219364 2.7 2.9
Source: ABS, Final Budget Outcome various & Macroeconomics.com.au estimates. CPI-NF was 
used for the price deflator to control for the terms of trade effect.  To my knowledge no consistent functional 
spending series is published in Australia.  This situation has not been corrected by the bureaucracy despite 
repeated requests (Moore 2005, 13) and has assisted in obscuring the extent of the public spending. The best 
data available is to start with the the functional tables that are published annually with the Budget papers and then 
to make manual judgement based adjustments to adjust for the impact of GST and the transition from cash to 
accruals. Underlying cash data rather than GFS expenses were used prior to 1999-2000.  If the Department of 
Finance series is not consistent, the ABS series will be even worse.  
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marginal electorates via the new’s cycle.  The brazen way in which ministers announced 
these commitments in the pursuit of political objectives was truly astonishing.  Meanwhile 
the bureaucracy stood by on the sidelines.
The malfunctioning public sector has affected overall economic performance both through 
its direct contribution to demand for goods and services and indirectly via its failure to raise 
the performance of public services in building the skills and quality infrastructure that are in 
such short supply.
The distributive role of fiscal policy to target the most disadvantaged has failed due to a 
lack of means testing to identify the most disadvantaged individuals in society. Instead the 
bulk of new social spending was shared with those people who could take care of 
themselves.  Evidence for this is presented in Section 3.3 below.
The sustainability role of fiscal policy was compromised through failing to benchmark 
fiscal policy settings to make the best use of current circumstances and through failing to 
acknowledge all of the policy challenges facing the community over the longer term 
including those related to the environment and infrastructure challenges.  However, the 
Intergeneration Report has been a welcome development.  It could be more useful too if it 
followed the Productivity Commission example of including the States and recognised the 
broader costs associated with participation and productivity enhancing reforms.
3.2 Growth areas of budget spending 
So where did all the money go?  Table 3 shows real spending over the last period since 
1996-97 and divides that into two sub periods between 1996-97 & 1998-99 (the period of 
consolidation) and 1999-2000 & 2006-07 the period of fiscal easing.7  The bulk of the new 
dollars have been spent in social security and health, national security and general public 
                                                  
7
Another reason for choosing to divide the 10 year period in this way is the structural break presented by the 
introduction of the accruals budget management system.  Returning to the issue of the functional spending series, 
there is still in existence 30 years of consistent functional spending data for the period prior to the introduction of 
accruals, classified by accounting line, along with the corporate knowledge to marry this data with the new gross 
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services. These spending areas represent the obvious candidates for significant reductions. 
Breaking these functions down into historical program and agency spending trends as well 
as agency staffing levels, will no doubt make for interesting reading.  Given that there was 
no clear justification for real spending increases in any area (save national security after 
September 11), establishing a baseline for discretionary savings should be straightforward 
and should certainly include savings from all areas that have consistently averaged growth 
in excess of 3 per cent of GDP (growth not supported by a growing economy).
3.3 Worst spending policy decisions of the last decade 
So where did the money go? Perhaps a good place to start would be the major policy 
announcements of the previous Government from 1999-2000. 
Perhaps the most short sighted decision of the previous government was to gradually 
reduce eligibility requirements for the Age Pension, the single largest spending program             
($22 billion) and with an ageing population which should drive spending growth for years to 
come.  Then a number of non means tested programs were introduced such as Carers 
Payment, Family Tax Benefit B and the Baby Bonus where there are no eligibility criteria 
whatsoever.  
There are programmes like Natural Resource Management, Exceptional Circumstances 
Assistance and Regional Partnerships with a blank cheque to spend whatever they can that 
generally fail to get the enough money out the door to meet their budget estimates. Next 
was the resort to one-off payments before the 30 June over the last four years to reduce 
the estimated budget surplus in the Budget year.  The total of payments averaged 
$3.2 billion in each year and included some very special causes.8
There are programs like the Medicare Safety Net which specifically undermine the goals of 
first or second best health care policy and were pursued for more ideological reasons and 
have not improved the quality of outcomes for patients.   The list goes on…and on.
                                                                                                                                             
expenses series.  A consistent time series produced at a fine level of detail would assist budget and program 
analysis and planning and would facilitate performance assessment. It would also allow for the back casting of 
series following any future changes to budget accounting rules. 
8
Discretionary payments to important cultural institutions such as a circus school come to mind.
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4 Framework for Achieving Budget Cuts
The new Government has been slow off the blocks on macroeconomic management. Their 
lower energy levels in December 2007 were understandable after a long campaign. Less 
understandable is why the new Government were not presented with comprehensive 
savings options to restore the credibility of fiscal policy on the Sunday morning after the 
election. Instead it appears that PM&C, Treasury and Finance, advice was something like 
achieve “small and straightforward savings in the May Budget and defer significant 
reductions pending further analysis which may be completed in the lead up to SMR in 
November”. 
4.1 Suggested approach 
Significant savings are easily achieved where the facts are put on the table and where 
political will exists for change.  It would have been possible to achieve the necessary 
reductions in one afternoon if all the relevant parties were brought together in one room 
with the Department of Finance’s program spending database.  The window of opportunity 
afforded to the new Government during the political honeymoon is soon going to be over. 
By Budget night 2008, the bureaucracy may have wasted almost 6 months for net savings
of less than $5 billion. Already the RBA has raised official interest rates by 75 basis points 
since the last election and there is no prospect of reductions in the near term. In addition, it 
may be that deferring the pain now will contribute to a larger downturn later. The aim of the 
game of fiscal policy setting in 2008 (and 2009) is to provide more room for the productive 
sector to do its thing.
4.2 Savings targets 
The single most effective way the new government can promote the credibility and 
sustainability of macro policy setting in Australia is to immediately devise a savings
package of the order of $20-30 billion targeting calendar year 2008 (as part of the 2008-09 
Budget).  The private sector savings offset should counteract the direct impact of the 
savings package by about one-half (Comley et al  2002). However this would still reduce 
overall spending directly by around $10-15 billion over the next 18 months with the 
possibility of second round effects through spending multipliers. If these reductions are 
coupled with some efficient mechanism to defer the stimulus from the election tax cuts
than, the package should be perfectly timed at the peak of demand pressures and prevent 
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further interest rate increases in 2008 and 2009 (Charlton 2008).  Ironically this fiscal 
reduction should help to support activity in Australia while the United States recovers from 
recession and China slows to single digit growth levels.  Slower growth in Australia of
around 3¼ per cent in 2008-09, down from the 4¼ per cent forecast at the 2007-08
MYEFO, implies stronger and more stable growth over the outlook period.9
Some immediate saving strategies include means testing all welfare payments, not just 
some, based on wealth, and through tightening the eligibility criteria for certain programs.
Large savings can be achieved by scrapping all current indexation arrangements along with 
the efficiency dividend and replacing these with CPI indexation and directly compensating 
individual with less means.10 Large savings can also be achieve through the widespread 
adoption of competitive tendering processes, and incorporating economic efficiency 
principles into contract design, especially for the purchase of lumpy capital items and 
defence weapons platforms. Large savings can also be achieved through the 
recentralisation of some departmental expenses related to office space, certain legal and 
accounting services and IT Help Desks.
Some longer term savings strategies should include undertaking a complete audit new 
government spending decision from 1996-97 to identify waste, duplication and 
mismanagement in tax and program expenditures.  Another straight forward reform would 
be for government to agree to a list of all its program priorities and to return to the previous 
practice of reporting budget estimates, appropriations and outcomes against that program 
list.11  All agencies should be required to provide program lists and to report against them. It 
is also necessary to construct consistent historical program spending and functional data 
for a period greater than just three or seven years as is currently the case.  Another way to 
                                                  
9
Depending on the composition of the budget savings package, a reduction of around $30 billion in 2008-09 
would reduce output by around 1 percentage point after offsets are taken into account.  However, the likelihood is 
that lower interest rates will further mitigate the decline in output and that by 2009-10 the savings package will 
contribute to growth in the economy.  
10
This reform would remove the perverse incentives currently associated with the efficiency dividend. This sees 
agencies bid for new resources to replace losses incurred through the application of the efficiency dividend.  This 
sees smaller agencies with smaller budgets disproportionately targeted relative to large agencies, and agencies 
(or parts of agencies) that are actually operating efficiently disadvantaged because they incur further costs.
11
This would aid in performance assessment of various programs and also encourage agencies to publish 
quantitative and qualitative information about these programs to demonstrate their effectiveness.
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achieve savings and efficiency gains would be to hand over responsibility for program and 
agency health review to the Productivity Commission in conjunction with the ANAO. Further 
efficiency gains could be identified by having the Productivity Commission review
administered prices and by undertaking a stock take of Australia’s infrastructure assets 
each year to identify potential bottlenecks and their root causes as they emerge. 
Conclusion
The paper has two broad messages for policy makers in Australia.  Fiscal policy is currently 
misaligned and contributing to higher interest rates for households and business.  That a 
significant 2 per cent of GDP discretionary policy easing is justified and should be 
relatively quick and painless to achieve provided that some tough decisions are made now.  
However, the window of opportunity will soon close and the risks associated with deferring 
the hard decisions is great.
“The Labor Government inherited a public sector that was in poor shape.
 the tax base was narrow and marginal tax rates excessive.  The 
distorted investment patterns, weakened incentives to work and save, 
and encouraged tax avoidance and evasion.
 welfare assistance was not targeted and as a result taxpayers’ funds 
frequently churned through the public sector back into the middle and 
high income pockets.
 management systems were inadequate in both the general government 
and government business enterprise sectors (One Nation 1992, p.12).
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